In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 125 oped the theory of the swerve and applied it to the problem of voluntary action, also made use of it in his defense of moral responsibility" (l ~9-3o). The distinction Englert has in mind is between to hekousion and to eph' heroin, a distinction he had emphasized in his long chapter 5 on Aristotle, and insisted was important to Epicurus as well. But the promise is (...) not realized; we are told only that to eph' heroin is saved just as is to hekousion, by insisting that the swerve marks a causal break (135). The book then ends with some undigested matters: David Sedley's work on Epicurus 's On Nature and Don Fowler's suggestion that the mind's act of focus (epibole)might constitute a swerve. There is more to be said for their views. And more against. The last word on the subject has yet to be written. JEFFREY S. PURINTON Princeton University Gerard O'Daly. Augustine's Phzlosophy of Mind. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. Pp. xii + 241. $35.00. Paul Rigby. Original Sin in Augustine's "Confessions." Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987. Pp. 137. Paper, $17.95. Augustine's philosophy of the human person is one of the most neuralgic points in his thought, and the neuralgic soreness spreads to almost every other compartment of his thinking. Since there is still much to learn in this troubled area, one can only welcome the publication of these two studies. O'Daly's book aspires to deal with the entire list of questions involved in the ancient world's Platonic tractatus De anima, whereas Rigby focuses on a single issue, critically evaluating (and largely refuting) the contention put forth by Athanase Sage in two classic articles: that the Augustine who wrote the Confessions had not yet come to think of humanity as guilty of original sin. The breadth of O'Daly's focus also betrays a distinctly confident attitude toward the wide array of matters he must discuss; he seems to view the Augustinian field as relatively trouble free. The central chapters of his book originated as a Habilitation thesis for the University of Heidelberg: hence the generous display of German scholarship, but also a greater serenity toward the difficulties non-German students might perhaps raise against some of his conclusions. He moves from Augustine's general theory of the soul, through claapters on the soul's "lower" activities (sense-perception, imagination, and memory), to that peculiar Augustinian preoccupation with the soul's measurement of time; he then concludes with the psychology of what Augustine would term "knowledge" in the higher (i.e., intellectual) sense of the term. The atmosphere throughout is encyclopedic, but then so is the impressive scale of O'Daly's learning; at the end, though, the reader is especially grateful for the two valuable indices---one topical the other an Index locorum--which help in retrieving the multitude both of texts and topics O'Daly handles. O'Daly is confident that Augustine's views on most of these matters solidified early on, so he feels entitled tojump about from early to late works and back again. Those who 126 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 199o find Augustine's thought more fluid will question this methodology, even find it circular ; it supposes a continuity of thought which ought rather to be proven. But this nondevelopmental approach results in another loss--the living sense of context, the controlled excitement that invariably marks Augustine's own thinking, has mostly drained off. This is all the more disappointing since O'Daly writes a pleasing prose style. But that judgment may only reflect the preferential conviction that we still have more exciting things to learn about Augustine's philosophy of human nature than O'Daly is willing to admit. Is this, one wonders, the reason why he ignores the many relevant insights contained in Oliver DuRoy's massive study? He is particularly adamant on the question of the soul's origin, yet one is at liberty to doubt that forty-four years of Augustine's thinking on this gnawing issue can be treated adequately in a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction VIOLENCE AND INSTITUTION IN CHRISTIANITY Robert J. Daly, SJ. Boston College We need both to define our terms and to indicate whether we are using them in a normative or descriptive sense. Thus the question: "Is Christianity"—or, if you will—"Are the institutions of Christianity violent or nonviolent?" can be answered with either a Yes, or a No, or with anything in between, depending on the meaning we (...) attach to theterms "violence," "institution," and "Christianity" (Daly 1997, 321-43). When we speak normatively, or take Christianity and its institutions accordingto its best ideals, Christianity isessentially nonviolent. But when we speak descriptively, i.e., take Christianity according to what the institutions ofChristianity have actually done, and according to how those who call themselves Christian have actually acted, we can make the argument that Christianity is violent, ffanalogous distinctions can be made from within the other four traditions, this might offer a good starting point for discussion. Adapting to my purpose standard dictionary definitions, I understand violence to include in a broad way the justified or unjustified human exertion of internal or external power or force in order to achieve an injurious or abusive end, i.e., an end that is against the will, the good, or the interests of those who suffer it. (This includes all war and avoids, at least at the outset, arguments about whether a war is or can be a "just war.") I understand institution in its ordinary meaning of: any significant or established practice, relationship, structure, system, or organization in a society or culture. I understand Christianity also in its ordinary sense: the Roberti. Daly, SJ.5 religion which, derived from Jesus Christ, and based on the Bible, is professed by Eastern, Roman Catholic, and Protestant bodies. Now, to help set the background for our discussion, I will try to list and briefly describe, relative to this theme, some of the major aspects or "moments" of Christianity (or Christian History), and do this in an approximately diachronic or chronological order. Much of this will be descriptive, but I will not go out of my way to dissociate the descriptions from the effects of all normative claims. I.Violence and Institution in the History of Christianity [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. [2]The pervasiveness of violence in the Bible. [3]The Christian Scriptures present themselves as a gospel of peace. [4]Jesus and nonviolence. [5]Early Christians and nonviolence. [6]The early Christians and the military. [7]The "Constantinian turn." [8]Caesaro-papism. [9]The relegation ofChristian pacifism to religious and monastic life. [10]The just war theory. [11]The medieval Christian taken-for-grantedness of violence. [12]The Crusades. [13]Medieval Christian peace movements [14]Christians and heretics. The Inquisition. See [11] above. [1 5]Christianity and the witches. See [U] above. [16]The Reformation. [17]The Radical Reformation and the Peace Churches. [18]St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (August 1572). [19]The religious wars. [20]Absolutism. [21]Modernity. [22]The Quakers—Religious Society of Friends. [23]The Enlightenment and Modernity. [24]Christianity and world mission; Christianity and colonialism. [25]Slavery. [26]Christianity and the "war" against native cultures. [27]Christianity and the First World War. [28]The Second World War. [29]The Holocaust. 6 Violence and Institution in Christianity [30]Christianity and the modern peace movement. [31]Christians and the "seamless ethic of life." [32]Christianity and International Communism. [33]Liberation theology. [34]The liberation of women. [35]Christianity and the resurgence of tribal and nationalist violence. [36]Christianity and human rights. [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. Christians and Jews have the same family origins. Since believing Christians no less than believing Jews accept and revere the Hebrew Scriptures as the inspired word of God, Christians and Jews are indeed, to paraphrase Pope John XXIII, siblings. There is, beyond this, fromJudaism to Christianity, a significant parent-child relationship. In recent years (but not early enough to have prevented the Holocaust), the main line churches ofChristianity have rejected the supersessionism (the doctrine that the Old Testament has been abrogated by the New Testament) that used to characterize Christian attitudes towards the Jews and that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EPILOGUE Robert J. Daly, SJ. Boston College April 2002 Iwill arrange my comments under four headings: (1) what we had hoped to accomplish; (2) what we actually did accomplish; (3) what we may have learned from this; (4) what this might now enable us to do in thefuture. This epilogueisbeingwritten in April, 2002,twenty-twomonths after the conference. To draw what good we can from this delay, writing at this (...) distance allows me to summarize and draw conclusions with, perhaps, a bit more balance. On the other hand, my listening again to the audio record in the course ofpreparing this publication has enabled me to relive something of the original experience. (1)As I indicated in the introduction, we had unrealistically hoped that, by the time ofthe conference, the five presenters, and perhaps also the twoprincipals inthe "Girard-Lonergan Conversation," wouldhavealready exchanged with each other not just first drafts, but even second drafts of their papers, and that the conference itself would then be invited to join a conversation that was already well under way. As it turned out, I couldn't muster the organizational skills and resources needed to achieve this. But reflecting after the fact, I can see that so carefully detailed a preparation might have been counterproductive. Carrying out our original plan might have been at the cost ofimposing more ofa Western analytic pattern on our discussion ofother traditions, and of!thus smothering from the outset some of the insight that did occur. We had also hoped that the opening "Girard-Lonergan Conversation" would provide an analytic resource for the rest of the meeting. But that did not happen to any great extent. (2)The proximate preparation for this conference began with a draft version ofmy paper being sent to the other major presenters. I opened with 194Robert J. Daly, SJ. a series of brief sketches of salient points in the often unhappy but also occasionally felicitous history ofChristianity on this theme ofviolence and institution. Then, after emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the normative and the descriptive, I tried to make some sense, both rational and theological, of all this data, especially by reflecting on the influences and consequences ofthe belief in hell, on the one hand, and the hope of universal salvation, on the other. The next major religious theme was Judaism. Reuven Kimelman provided a detailed—and, for some, overwhelming—glimpse of the way the talmudic traditions deal with the theme of war and its restrictions. This highly text-oriented and interpretation-of-texts driven presentation seemed to many, at first, to be irrelevant to mimetic theory and to the need to be confronting actual violence. But, in the course of Sandor Goodhart's response, and in the course ofthe at times spirited discussion that followed, we began to understand that how one interprets texts and traditions, and how these are played off against each other, is indeed fundamental to the way Jews typically try to deal with the practical challenges of violence. Qamar-ul Huda's presentation on IsIamfocused stronglyonthe way the spiritual teachings of Islam—i.e., islam as a religion rather than Islam as a political or national institution—foster peace. The initial reaction was somewhat similarto the reaction to Kimelman's paper: disappointment that Huda was not talking more directly about contemporary Muslim extremist violence. But here, too, the discussion enabled us to catch a glimpse both of the inner spiritual resources of Islam, and of the limitations ofthe range of concerns that Westerners typically bring to the table. Francis Clooney, in his presentation ofHinduism, strongly emphasized the great variety in Hinduism, stressing that one cannot speak ofHinduism as such. Much of this variety comes from the several millennia of Hindu history, and from the complex relationships to Buddhism and Jainism which, themselves, are important parts of Hindu history, and also from the fact that only recently have Hindus, after centuries of Moslem or Colonial domination, once again returned to positions of political and military power. Finally, Christopher Ives's presentation on Buddhism, in a way similar to my presentation on Christianity, but more extensively or more consequently, pointed out the various ways in which Buddhism has been politically and... (shrink)

Mark J. Cherry; Searching for the Truly Human: Standing at the Precipice of a Post-Christian Age, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Moralit.

Bioethics functions within a world of deep moral pluralism; a universe of discourse debating ethical analysis, public policy, and clinical practice in which a common, generally accepted morality does not exist. While religious thinkers are often approached within a hermeneutic of suspicion for assuming moral standards that cannot be justified in rational terms, secular bioethicists routinely find themselves in exactly the same intellectual predicament. That ethical theory, proposed values, or normative content is secular, that it does not invoke God or (...) any particular religious perspective, does not mean that it is rationally grounded, necessarily true, or universally binding. As the authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy make clear, this normative reality directly impacts debates regarding concepts of health, illness, and disease, accounts of socially acceptable health-risky behaviors, and the political frameworks that shape public policy. As a result, honest discussion of diverse moral, religious, and political perspectives remains essential in clarifying the intellectual challenges, ethical intuitions, and ideological judgments that shape clinical practice and healthcare policy. Depending on which moral, political, or scientific concepts are guiding bioethical analysis, careful scrutiny will tend to support rather different policies and practices, each of which is likely to be worth careful consideration. (shrink)

Examines the political significance of ideas about happiness through the work of utilitarian philosophers William Thompson and Jeremy Bentham. Happiness is political. The way we think about happiness affects what we do, how we relate to other people and the world around us, our moral principles, and even our ideas about how society should be organized. Utilitarianism, a political theory based on hedonistic and individualistic ideas of happiness, has been dominated for more than two-hundred years by its founder, Jeremy Bentham. (...) In Happiness, Democracy, and the Cooperative Movement, Mark J. Kaswan examines the work of William Thompson, a friend of Bentham’s who nonetheless offers a very different utilitarian philosophy and political theory based on a different conception of happiness, but whose work has been largely overlooked. Kaswan reveals the importance of our ideas about happiness for our understanding of the basic principles and nature of democracy, its role in society and its character as a social institution. In what is the closest examination of Thompson’s political theory to date, Kaswan moves from philosophy to theory to practice, starting with conceptions of happiness before moving to theories of utility, then to democratic theory, and finally to practice in the first detailed account of how Thompson’s ideas laid the foundations for the cooperative movement, which is now the world’s largest democratic social movement. Mark J. Kaswan is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Brownsville and J. Robert Beyster and Michael W. Huber Fellow, Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations. (shrink)

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification (...) of human body parts? Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges, would save more lives and further reduce human suffering. (shrink)

Death has become banal. It is devoid of meaning, if not simply surd. Yet, not even the very best of medicine can cure death. Most will suffer, except perhaps those who die suddenly while very young...

The last half-century has seen enormous changes in society’s attitude toward sexuality. In the 1950s, homosexuals in the United States were routinely arrested; today, homosexual activity between consenting adults is legal in every state, with same-sex marriage legal in Massachusetts and Connecticut. In the 1950s, ambitious women were often seen as psychopathological and were told by psychoanalysts that they had penis envy that needed treatment; today, a woman has campaigned for President of the United States. Mark Blechner has lived (...) and worked through these startling changes in society, and _Sex Changes _collects papers he has written over the last 45 years on sex, gender, and sexuality. Interspersed with these papers are reflections on the changes that have occurred during that time period, both within the scope of society at large as well as in his personal experiences inside and outside of the therapeutic setting. He shows how changes in society, changes in his life, and changes in his writing on sexuality - as well as changes within psychoanalysis itself - have affected one another. One hundred years ago, psychoanalysis was at the cutting edge of new ideas about sex and gender, but in the latter half of the 20 th Century, psychoanalysts were often seen as reactionary upholders of society’s prejudices. _Sex Changes _seeks to restore the place of psychoanalysis as the "once and future queer science," and aims for a radical shift in psychoanalytic thinking about sexuality, gender, normalcy, prejudice, and the relationship of therapeutic aims and values. (shrink)

Mark J. Cherry; Foundations of the Culture Wars: Compassion, Love, and Human Dignity, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 7.

Organ procurement policy from the recently deceased recasts families into gatekeepers of a scarce medical resource. To the frustration of organ procurement teams, families do not always authorize organ donation. As a result, efforts to increase the number of organs available for transplantation often seek to limit the authority of families to refuse organ retrieval. For example, in some locales if a deceased family member has satisfied the legal conditions for first-person prior assent, a much looser and easier standard to (...) satisfy than informed consent, organ retrieval may proceed despite the family’s objections. Some countries have replaced voluntary consent to organ donation with forms of organ conscription. Often referred to under the misnomer “presumed consent,” such policies legalize the harvesting of organs at death, unless individuals exercise official options to opt out. As this article explores, however, there are good grounds for affirming the authority of the family to consent to or to deny organ donation on behalf of recently deceased family members, as well as to reject first-person assent and “presumed consent” policies of organ procurement. Insofar as individuals have failed clearly and competently to provide informed consent to organ donation, moral authorization for the use of the person and his body ought to be grounded on the foundational authority of the family, rather than the state’s supposed interests in obtaining organs for transplantation. (shrink)

This study explores the ways in which adolescents, even so-called “mature minors”, lack adequate development of the intellectual, affective, and emotional capacities necessary morally to consent to medical research on their own behalf. The psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than mature adults. They lack full adult maturity and personal agency. As a result, in addition to the usual requirements for IRB approval, one or both parents, or a (...) legal guardian, should provide informed consent for minor children to participate in medical research. (shrink)

This essay addresses two growing edges of the just war tradition. First, theorists have been accused of focusing narrowly on justifying war and governing its conduct, neglecting wider considerations that encompass justice during the years prior to and after war. Second, calling a war "just" allegedly makes it seem "good" so that it is easier to fight a war and to bend or set aside the rules. Based on "imperfect justice," we argue for a "justified" war theory, taking all criteria (...) and categories seriously, including jus ante bellum and jus post bellum. (shrink)

This book represents a unique contribution to the field of clinical ethics consultation. What might seem at first glance to be an anthology, that is, a collection of independent essays, is actually more akin to a conversation, a shared engagement, a mutual undertaking. At the center of this conversation is a steadfastness, abiding and serious in its orientation – exemplified in these voices and contributions collected from colleagues – to explore, identify, and examine the actual conduct of individuals who engage (...) in ethics consultation practice. Although there is some helpful resemblance to an anthology, for example in the variety of ways these essays describe and depict a complex array of different standpoints regarding the practical and conceptual commitments in this growing field, more important to the Zadeh Project is the deliberate focus on explicating and probing the ways these commitments influence how a particular individual acting as an “ethics consultant” might understand and interpret the roles and prevalent expectations represented by those differing standpoints. In that light, and perhaps more urgently, this book is motivated by a mutual recognition that part and parcel with the responsibility of doing clinical ethics is an ongoing and clear need to describe and consider what clinical ethics consultants actually encounter when actively working with physicians, nurses, social workers, and other healthcare providers as well as with patients, families, and others who care about patients. As a contribution to that necessity of being accountable, this Project and the resulting book represent much more than merely collecting together the thoughts and perspectives of a group of colleagues from within a common field: this book is an attempt to display, to model through written text, a set of practices and what is at stake in these practices. (shrink)

Lutz focuses on the sections of Phaedo, Parmenides, Symposium, and Apology that shed light on Socrates’ intellectual biography. Taken together, Lutz argues, these passages reveal the stages of Socrates’ education in human things, especially his reasons for pursuing knowledge of eros. For Lutz, making sense of Socrates’ philosophic development is essential for explaining why Socrates engages others—including unpromising non-philosophers—in conversation and refutation. Lutz concludes by attempting to resolve certain puzzles in Apology, particularly Socrates’ seemingly contradictory statements about the god and (...) his divine mission. (shrink)

This broad ranging and thought provoking set of readings stresses the diversity of responses in the way the natural environment has been understood and questioned in the modern world.

Accounts of natural law moral philosophy and theology sought principles and precepts for morality, law, and other forms of social authority, whose prescriptive force was not dependent for validity on human decision, social influence, past tradition, or cultural convention, but through natural reason itself. This volume critically explores and assesses our contemporary culture wars in terms of: the possibility of natural law moral philosophy and theology to provide a unique, content-full, canonical morality; the character and nature of moral pluralism; the (...) limits of justifiable national and international policy seeking to produce and preserve human happiness, social justice, and the common good; the ways in which morality, moral epistemology, and social political reform must be set within the broader context of an appropriately philosophically and theologically anchored anthropology. This work will be of interest to philosophers, theologians, bioethicists, ethicists and political scientists. (shrink)

The day-to-day work of clinical ethics consultants and healthcare ethics committees can easily become overly routine. Too much routine, however, comes with a risk that morally important practices will be reduced to mere bureaucratic formalities, while practitioners become desensitized to ethically significant distinctions between cases. Clinical ethics consultation and organizational ethics must be set within the broader social and cultural context of the healthcare environment. This practice requires looking beyond mere legal compliance and the routinely false assumption that there are (...) unambiguous ethical norms that easily govern clinical ethics and hospital policy formation. Together the essays in this issue of HEC Forum challenge readers to rethink taken-for-granted assumptions regarding patient care, physician obligation, clinical ethics consultation, and organizational ethics. (shrink)

This essay considers Richard Zaners storytelling in Troubled Voices as a form of possibilizing which uses the stories to exemplify important moral themes such as contingency and freedom. Distinguishing between activities of moral discovery through the telling of a story and posing in the sense of writing to tell the moral of the story, I suggest that something crucial goes on for Zaner in his own tellings. Several of the more insistent implications Zaner reveals about the moral relationships encountered in (...) the activity of clinical ethics consultation are examined in that light, especially regarding this question: is it more beneficial, or harmful, to articulate elements of core meanings and values that are entailed in individual viewpoints, which, prior to an ethics consultants participation, may have remained unspoken and possibly unacknowledged? (shrink)

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Book reviewed in this article: Theological Voices in Medical Ethics. Edited by Allen Verhey and Stephen E. Lammers.

ABSTRACTLeo Strauss argues that the “theologico-political” problem arose from the competing claims of rationalist philosophy and theology. Although he urges others to take sides in this debate, most theorists see it as insoluble, since it is rooted in competing traditions and different, non-demonstrable, epistemic principles. Strauss, however, argues that there is a common ground capable of sustaining a contest between the two: their appeal to the pre-philosophic understanding of justice as moral virtue. The contest between the Bible and Socratic-Platonic philosophy (...) centers on which of the two better understands what justice is, what completes it, and in what respect it is good. Strauss enables us to see why Plato’s Socratic dialogues became indispensable models for classical and medieval philosophers who sought to meet the challenge of theology on the vital common ground of philosophy and theology. (shrink)

While many have suggested that to withdraw medical interventions is ethically equivalent to withholding them, the moral complexity of actually withdrawing life supportive interventions from a patient cannot be ignored. Utilizing interplay between expository and narrative styles, and drawing upon our experiences with patients, families, nurses, and physicians when life supports have been withdrawn, we explore the changeable character of boundaries in end-of-life situations. We consider ways in which boundaries imply differences – for example, between cognition and performance – and (...) how the encounter with boundaries can generate altered meanings important for understanding decisions and actions in these contexts. We conclude that the reliance on mere roles to support the moral weight of withdrawing medical interventions is inadequate. Roles that lead us to such moments are exceeded by the responsibility encountered in such moments. And here, we suggest, is the momentous character of withdrawal: it presents the grave astonishment, the trembling awe, in the not-being-there of the other in death. (shrink)